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1. Introduction 
In Kranich [6], we proposed an axiomatic approach to ranking distributions 
of opportunities on the basis of fairness. Specifically, we considered the 
case of n agents, each of whom faces a finite set of opportunities, and we 
demonstrated that it is possible to construct a complete, reflexive, and 
transitive relation defined over profiles of such sets that satisfies several 
intuitively appealing criteria for fairness. However, the restriction to 
finite opportunity sets is quite limiting and precludes most economic 
applications. In this paper, we extend the framework to general topological 
spaces. In particular, this allows for connected subsets of a finite Euclidean 
space. 
As in the previous paper, our approach is axiomatic. But here, rather than 
concern ourselves with characterizing a particular ordinal relation, we 
establish conditions under which such a relation admits of a cardinal 
representation of a particularly intuitive form, which we call an advantage 
fundíon. Such a function indicates both the extent of inequality and the 
distribution of advantage among the agents. 
We begin with the two-agent' case in Sections 2 and 3, where we develop the 
basic framework. Then, in Sections 4 and S, we build upon the two-agent 
results to extend the analysis to include additional agents. Section 6 
contains a brief conclusion in which we discuss the significance of the results 
and their relationship to our earlier work. 
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2. The Two-Agent Case 
Let X be a universal set of opportunities. For reasons of generality, we do 
not specify the nature of the elements in X. Let IP(X) denote the set of 
1
nonempty subsets of X. We consider a topological space XS;;IP(X). An 
opportunity set for agent i is an element deX. 
In this section, we consider the case of only two agents. Hence, a profile 
2
of opportunity sets is a pair 0=(d,02)eX =XxX, and an equality relation is a 
complete, reflexive, and transitive relation (Le., a weak order) ~2 defined on 
2 2 2X • For 0,0' eX , we write O ~2 O', meaning the opportunity sets in O are at 
least as equitable as those in O'. >2 (more equitable than) and ~2 (equally 
equitable) are the asymmetric and symmetric components of ~2, respectively, and 
are defined in the usual way. 
3Sorne examples of equality relations are the following: 
e 
EXAMPLE 1. Let X be a (Lebesque) measurable subset of IR , and suppose one's 
opportunities can be described by a measurable subset of X. Then let X be the 
<T-algebra of all such subsets. And define the Lebesgue difference in 0=(d,02) 
by LD(O)= I¡.L(01)_¡.L(02) 1, where ¡.L is the Lebesgue measure restricted to X. The 
Lebesgue dif ference relation ~D is defined by 
1We formulate the problem in general terms since different topologies may be 
appropriate for different domains. For discussions of topologies defined on 
spaces of subsets, see Kuratowski [7] and Bourbaki [2]. For additional 
references, see Klein and Thompson [5]. 
2In "~2,, and elsewhere, we use the superscript "2" to distinguish the two-agent 
case. 
3 e eIR denotes the e-dimensional Euclidean space, and IR its nonnegative cone. 
e + 
For x,yeIR , x· y denotes the Euclidean inner product, and l, I denotes absolute 
value. 
2 
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o >2 O' ~ LO(O) ~ LO(O').
I...D 
EXAMPLE 2. Consider the case of a large market economy in which each 
individual has a prívate production seto For two agents, neither of whom can 
influence prices, we can compare consumption (trading) opportunities on the 
basis of the maximum values of their production sets as follows. 
Let x=[Fl and let X be the set of neocLassical production sets. 4 AIso, let 
pet/·-1 be given, where ~t-l denotes the (t-l)-dimensional unit simplex. For 
OeX, define v(O;p)=max{p' x IxeO). Then the v-difference, or value difference, 
in 0=(d,02) is given by VO(O)= Iv(Ol;p)_v(02;p) l. The value difference 
2
relation :> is defined by
""VD 
votO) ~ VO(O,).5 
EXAMPLE 3. Since individuals may be willing to trade off potential earnings 
for other job amenities, the actual distribution of earnings among equally 
abled individuals might be quite skewed. Therefore, from society's 
perspective, an appropriate comparison of employment opportunities might be 
based, first, on potential earnings and, second, on other job characteristics. 
For simplicity, consider the case of a single nonwage characteristic, called 
"quality. " Let x measure earnings and x measure quality. We take X to be [R2
1 2 + 
and X to be the set of all combinations of x and x that an individual might
1 2 
face. Then from society's point of view, comparísons can be made 
lexicographically as follows: 
For OeX2, let xl=max{xll (xl ,xl )ed} and x 1=max{x l I (xl ,xl )ed}. Oefine the1 112 2 212 
4Le., each YeX is closed, convex, bounded above, and satisfies _[Rt~y and 
+tYn[R+={O}. 
5Note that this relation is parametric on the price vector p. 
3 
l' h' d'ff . 0-_(01,02 )-, by
.exteograp te t erenee in 
A A1 2if X *x ,
XD(O) ={ Ix~ - x~1 1 1 
2Ix1 _ x , otherwi se. 
2 2 
The lexieographie differenee relation ~D is defined by 
O >2 O' ~ XD(O) ~ XD(O'). 
'"}(D 
In each of the aboye examples, the comparison between O and O' is based on 
the magnitude of a real-valued function. Generally, we will say an equality 
relation ~2 is represented by a function f:X2~ if 
O ~2 O' if and only if f(0) ~ f(0'). 
(Clearly, if f represents ~ 2 , then -f also provides an appropriate ranking. 
That is, for all 0,0' eX2 , O ~2 O' if and only if -f(0) ~ -f(0'). Although an 
abuse of terminology, we will say -f represents ~2 as well. Intuitively, while 
f provides an index of fairness, -f measures unfairness.) 
In the sequel, we will investigate conditions under which an equality 
relation admits of a representation of a particularly intuitive formo But 
first, given ~2, we will say i is poor relative to j at O, denoted ieP(O;j), if 
I II I j 2 I j6there exists O' eX such that 0':>0 and (O' ,O) > (O ,O ). We will write 
P(O)*12l if ieP(O;j), for sorne i,j. For future reference, if iÉP(O;j) and 
6Intuitively, if an expansion of l's opportunity set were to increase equality, 
that would identify her as "poor" and thus agent 2 as "rich." Similarly, if a 
contraction of 2's set were to increase equality, that too would establish the 
same relative ranking, and the analysis could be carried out using this 
alternative identification procedure. Note, however, that the opposite is not 
true due to rank reversals. That is, if an expansion of l's set were to 
decrease fairness, that would not identify her as rich. It may be the case 
that initially agent 1 is poor relative to 2, and yet l's opportunity set 
expands to such an extent that the relative ranking is reversed and the overall 
skewness increased. 
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jE:P(O;il, then we will say i is in the same class as j and write ieC(O;j). And 
if ieP(O;j) or ieC(O;j), we will say i is weakLy poor reLative to j (or no 
richer than j) and write ieWP(O;j). 
OEFlNITION 2.1. A (2-agent) advantage function is a mapping a2:X2~2 that 
2 2 2
associates with each OeX a pair of real numbers (a (0),a (0)) such that 
1 2 
2 2 2 2(O a (0)+a (0)=O, and (2) a (0)<a (0) if and only if iep(0;j).7
1 2 1 J 
An advantage function indicates the direction and magnitude of the skewness 
2 2
of O. If a (0)<a (0), then j enjoys an advantage relative to i, or i suffers a 
1 J 
disadvantage. The magnitude of the advantage can be measured by Ela2( O) I .8 
1 
1 
Consistent with the above terminology (although again a slight abuse), we will 
2 2 2 2 . 
say the advantage function a :X ~ represents ~ lf 
O ~2 O' 
3. A Representation Theorem for ~ 2 
Let (52 denote the subdomain of X2 in which the agents have identical 
opportunity sets, Le., (52::{OeX2 I d=02}. We refer to (52 as the egaLitarian 
domain, and we denote a generic element of (52 by Oe. 
We define the following properties of an equality relation ~2: 
2 27With only two agents, conditions (l) and (2) imply a (0)<O<a (0), when 
1 J 
ieP(O;j). 
8 2 1 2 2Alternatively, since Ia (O) I= -El a (O) 1, Ia (O) I would yield the same ranking
1 2 1 1 
1 
of profiles as defined below. 
5 
2Acyclicity of the Strict Relative Poverty Relation (ACYCL2): For aH OeX , for 
i,j=1,2, i;ej, if ieP(O;j), then jEP(O;i). 
2 e 2 2 e 2Uniformity (UNIF ): For aH O ef; and for aH OeX , O ;::. O. 
2Continuity (CONT2): For aH OeX2 , {O' eX I O' ~2 O} and {O' eX2 I O ;::.2 O'} are 
X2closed (in the product topology on ). 
According to ACYCL2, if an expansion of agent 1'5 opportunity set is 
equality enhancing, then expansions of 2'5 should be (weakly) equality 
detracting. Thus, it requires that ;::.2 be logicaHy consistent: having 
identified i as poor relative to j, it cannot identify j as poor relative to i. 
UNIF2 means the most equitable distributions are those in which the agents have 
identical, or uniform, opportunities. CONT2 is a standard technical condition. 
THEOREM 3.1. Let X be a connected, separable, topological space9, 10; and let ;::.2 
2 2 2
satisfy ACYCL , UNIF , and CONT • Then there exists a continuous advantage 
. 2 2 2 2functlOn a :X ~ that represents ~ . 
Proof. First, note that since X is connected and separable, the product X2 is 
9A topological space is connected if it cannot be partitioned into two 
disjoint, nonempty, closed sets. It is separable if it contains a countable 
dense subset. 
lOFor example, if X is a (Lebesque) measurable subset of 1R2 and X is the 
cr-algebra of aH measurable subsets of X, then X is separable and connected in 
the topology constructed in Berliant [1] to describe preferences defined over 
parcels of land. 
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as well. l1 And by definition, ~2 is a complete preorder on 1'2. Since ~2 
2
satisfies CONT , it follows from Eilenberg [4]12 that there is a continuous 
function W: 1'2-7lR such that 
o ~2 O' if and only if w(Ol~w(O').	 (l) 
Clearly, (1) is preserved when translating w by a constant. Therefore, by 
2 e e 2 2UNIF , we may assume O=w(O l~w(O), for all O e(5 and for all OeX . 
We must show that whenever P(0):;t:0, w(O)<O. However, this follows easily 
from the definition of relative poverty. Suppose, for instance, that 1eP(0;2). 
1 1 1 1 2 2Then, there exists O' eX, O' :>0, such that (O' ,O ) > O. Therefore, 
Next, we derive an advantage function a 2 from w as follows. Let 
-WO(O) 2eP(0; 1) 
a 
2 (01
1 
= 
{ 
w( O) if 1eP(0; 2) 
otherwise 
and let a 2(0)=_a2 (0). Note that by ACYCL2, a 2 is well-defined. That is, if 
2 1 
ieP(O;j), then it cannot be the case that jeP(O;il, and vice versa. By 
construction, a~(O)<o<a~(Ol if and only if ieP(O;j), and also by construction, 
2 2 2 
a (0)+a (01=O. Finally, since w is continuous, a is as well. I 
1 2 
For Examples 1 and 2 in Section 2, we can easily construct a continuous 
advantage function. First, for OeX2, define ¡:leO)= ~(/ledl+/l(02)) and 
2 
- 11 2 2 1- 2- 2
v(O)= 2(v(0 ;p)+v(O ;pl)' Then aLD(O)=(/l(O )-/l(O),/l(O )-/l(0)) represents ;;:D' 
2 1 - 2 - 2
and a (O)=(v(O ;p)-v(Ol,v(O ;pl-v(O)) represents ~, . 
VD vD 
The lexicographic difference relation in Example 3, however, violates the 
11See Munkres [8, p.190-192]. 
12See also Debreu [3, Proposition 4]. 
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assumption of CONTz. Thus; while it is clearly representable as described 
aboye, the representation is not continuous. 
4. An n-Agent Generalization 
In this section, we take ~z satisfying the conditions in Theorem 1 as given. 
Consequently, there exists a continuous representation a Z of ~z which we take 
as given as well. Then based on the results of the previous section, we use ~z 
to extend the analysis to include additional agents. We begin by generalizing 
the notation. 
Let N={1, ... ,n} be a finite set of agents, with n>2. We now consider 
profiles of opportunity sets of the form o=(d, ... ,on)eXn, where Xn=X X. 
leN 
XnAlthough the domain of an equality relation is now , the interpretation 
remains the same; we write O ~n O'. 
To be consistent with our earlier reasoning, whatever principIes of fairness 
we apply to the n-agent case should generalize the axioms in Section 3. 
Indeed, one might be tempted to consider n-agent relations ~n~xnxxn for which 
the projections onto the two-agent subspaces are consistent with the previous 
axioms. This is inappropriate, however; with additional agents, new 
considerations arise. Suppose, for example, there are three agents and agent 
is poor relative to agent 2. In the subspace pertaining to agents 1 and 2, 
expanding 2'5 opportunity set should decrease fairness. However, in the three 
agent problem, expanding 2'5 set might increase fairness (say, by making 2'5 
and 3'5 sets more equitable). In other words, it is unreasonable to suppose 
123 1 Zthat the evaluation of fairness of the projection of (0,0 ,O ) onto (O ,O ) 
should be independent of 0 3 . Instead, we will directly construct an 
appropriate n-agent relation from ~2. 
8 
First, based on ~2, we can establish a ranking of the agents by applying ~2 
to aH pairs. Given OeXn, we wiH say i is poor relative to j at O if there 
exists O/leX such that O/I::>d and (O/I,oJ) >2 (d,oJ), and again we denote by 
P(O;j) the set of agents who are poor relative to j. (C(O;j) and WP(O;j) are 
defined analogously.) 
n
DEFINITION 4.1. An n-agent advantage function is a mapping a :Xn-7lRn that 
associates with each OeXn a list of real numbers (an(O), ... ,an(O)) such that 
1 n 
(1) ¿ an(O)=O, and (2) an(O)<an(O) if and only if ieP(O;j).
1 1 J 
leN 
Again an advantage function indicates the direction and magnitude of the 
skewness of O. Bilaterally, if an(O)<an(O), then j enjoys an advantage
1 J 
relative to i, and globally, those agents for whom an(O»O enjoyan advantage
1 
relative to those for whom an(O)<O. The magnitude of the (aggregate) advantage
i 
n I 13 . n n n n 
can be measured by [1 a (O). We w111 saya :X -7IR represents ~ if 
1 
1 
O ~n O/ if and only if ¿lan(O)1 ~ [lan(o/)I. 
1 1 1 1 
5. A Representation Theorem for ~n 
The foHowing properties generalize those of Section 3: 
Strong Transitivity of the Weak Relative Poverty Relation (STRANSn): For aH 
OeXn, and for aH i,j,keN, if ieWP(O;j) and jeWP(O;k), then ieWP(O;k); and if 
2 2ieP(O;j) and jeP(O;k), then a (d,Ok) > a (OJ,Ok).
k k 
13 n nHere an alternative measure would be ¿ a (O), where A(O)={ieN I a. (O»O},
1 1 
1eA(Q ) 
since this is simply ':'[1 an(O) l. 
2 1 
i 
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n n nContinuity (CONT ): For aH OeX • {O' eX I O' ~n O} and {O' exn I O ~n O'} are 
Xnclosed (in the product topology on ). 
UNIFn and CONTn are straightforward generalizations of the axioms in Section 
3. STRANSn is somewhat more restrictive than transitivity of the weak relative 
poverty relation. In addition to requiring the latter, it also imposes the 
quite reasonable condition that in the event ieP(O;j) and jeP(O;k), the extent 
of the advantage enjoyed by k relative to i should exceed that enjoyed by k 
relative to j. Note that with only two agents, STRANSn is equivalent to 
THEOREM 5.1. Let X be a connected. separable, topological space; and let ~n 
n
satisfy STRANSn, UNIFn, and CONT . Then there exists a continuous advantage 
. n n n nfunctlOn a :X ~ that represents ~ . 
Proof. Let ~n satisfy the above axioms. First, we apply a 2 to each pair of 
2
agents separately. Then, for ieN, we define an(O)= La (d,OJ). We will show 
I J;é¡ I 
nthat an=(an.... ,a ) is a continuous advantage function that represents ~n. 
1 n 
2Notice that L an(O)= L La (d,OJ)= L (a2(d,oJ)+a2(d,oJ)) =0. 
I I I JleN leN J:;él 1, JeN 
Moreover, since each a~ is continuous, a~ is as well. We need only establish 
that an(O)(an(O) if and only if ieP(O;j).
I J 
First, suppose ieP(O;j) for sorne i,jeN, i:;é j. We must show that 
14The definition of gn is obvious. 
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L a 2(d,Ok)< L a 2(OJ,Ok). For this, it is sufficient to show that for each 
k:;t:1 l k:;t:J J 
2 2k:;t:i,j, a (d,Ok)<a (OJ,Ok). We consider several mutually exclusive and 
1 J 
exhaustive cases, each of which follows from STRANSn: 
O) jeP(O;k). 
21k 2Jk 21kThen ieP(O;k). Hence, both a (O ,O )<0 and a (O ,O )<0. Also, Ia (O ,O ) I 
l J k 
2 . 21k 21k 2Jk 2Jk> la (OJ,Ok) l. Therefore, smce a (O ,O )+a (O ,O )=a (O ,O )+a (O ,O )=0,
k l k J k 
a 2(0I,Ok)<a2(OJ,Ok), 
l J 
(2) keC(O;j). 
2 J kThen by definition, k~P(O;j) and j~P(O;k). Hence, a (O ,O )=0. Also,
J 
ieP(O;k) and so a 2(d,Ok)<0. Therefore, a 2(d,Ok)<a2(OJ,Ok). 
l l J 
(3) ieP(O;k) and keP(O;j). 
2 2If ieP(O;k) and keP(O;j), then a (d,Ok)<0 and a (OJ,Ok»O, Clearly, 
l J 
(4) keC(O;i). 
2 1 kThen by definition, k~P(O;i) and i~P(O;k). Hence, a (O ,O )=0, Also,
1 
keP(O;J') and so a 2(OJ,Ok»0. Therefore, a 2(01,Ok)<a2(OJ,Ok).
J i J 
(5) keP(O;i). 
2 2Then keP(O;J')' Hence, both a (d,Ok»0 and a (OJ,Ok»0. It then follows 
i J 
immediately that a 2(d,Ok)<a2(OJ,Ok). 
l J 
Finally, since WP(O;·) is complete (Le., for all i,jeN, either ieWP(O;j) 
or jeWP(O;i)), it is straightforward to show an(O)<an(O) implies ieP(O;j). I 
1 J 
Examples 1 and 2 in Section 2 can easily be generalized to include 
additional agents. 
First, define the mean (pairwise) Lebesgue difference in OeXn by 
11 
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MLD(O) = L L I~(O I )-~(O j ) I 
2n(n-1 )
I j 
Then we can define an ordinal generalization of ~D by 
O ~LD O' <=9 MLD(O) ~ MLD(O'). 
An advantage function representing ~~ is 
NILD 
2 1 - n -
a (O)=(~(O )-~(O), ... ,~(O )-~(O)), 
MLD 
- 1 I
where ~(O)= - L ~(O ). 
n 
I 
Similarly, define the mean (pairwise) value difference by 
1 2 
MVD(O) = \' \' Iv(O ;p)-v(O ;p) I 
L L 2n(n-1 )
I j 
2We can define an ordinal generalization of ~D by 
O >n O' <=9 MVD(O) ~ MVD(O').
'"1.1VD 
And an advantage function representing >n is 
'"1.1VD 
2 1 - n-
a (O)=(v(O ;p)-v(O) ..... ,v(O ;p)-v(O)),
MVD 
where v(O)= .!. L v(O\p). 
n 
I 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have established conditions under which an ordinal 
equality relation defined on profiles of opportunity sets admits a particularly 
intuitive cardinal representation in the form of an advantage function. The 
primary difference between this paper and [6] is that the latter considered 
only finite opportunity sets, whereas the present analysis pertains to general 
topological spaces. ConsequentIy, the present analysis is amenable to economic 
applications. 
A second distinction concerns the representations themselves. For the 
n-agent case, [6] identified conditions under which profiles of finite sets can 
12 
be compared on the basis of a linear function of the cardinalities of the sets. 
Clearly, the present result affords less structure, but it applies to a much 
broader class of environments. The principle advantage of this result is that 
it reduces the complexity of comparing sets to a single dimension, and, under 
the conditions of Theorem 5.1, it establishes that there is no loss of 
generality in assuming that profiles are ranked as if according to an advantage 
function. Consequently, an advantage function may provide a useful tool in 
evaluating equitable opportunities. 
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